Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to prove existence of an ε-equilibrium point in a dynamic Nash game with Borel state space and long-run time average cost criteria for the players. The idea of the proof is first to convert the initial game with ergodic costs to an "equivalent" game endowed with discounted costs for some appropriately chosen value of the discount factor, and then to approximate the discounted Nash game obtained in the first step with a countable state space game for which existence of a Nash equilibrium can be established. From the results of Whitt we know that if for any ε > 0 the approximation scheme is selected in an appropriate way, then Nash equilibrium strategies for the approximating game are also ε-equilibrium strategies for the discounted game constructed in the first step. It is then shown that these strategies constitute an ε-equilibrium point for the initial game with ergodic costs as well. The idea of canonical triples, introduced by Dynkin and Yushkevich in the control setting, is adapted here to the game situation.
The set of all histories h t will be denoted by H t := (E × U 1 × U 2 )
t × E, t ≥ 0. For each x ∈ E, B ∈ E and u i ∈ U i , i = 1, 2, we denote by p(x, B, u 1 , u 2 ) the time-homogeneous onestep transition probability of the controlled process, from the state x to the set B under the actions u 1 and u 2 taken by the players. Let also c i (x, u 1 , u 2 ) be an immediate cost incurred by player i = 1, 2 if the controlled process is in the state x and the actions u 1 and u 2 are applied by the players. The following assumptions will hold throughout the paper:
A1. p(x, B, u 1 , u 2 ) is uniformly continuous in x and continuous in u
is bounded and uniformly continuous in x and continuous in u 1 , u 2 for i = 1, 2. A3. There is a Borel measure ν on (E, E) satisfying
By an admissible strategy of player i we mean a sequence
is a regular stochastic kernel on (U i , U i ) with respect to the history h t , i = 1, 2 (see [1] , p. 134). The set of admissible strategies of player i will be denoted by
is called a stationary strategy for player i if µ i is a Borel measurable mapping from E to P(U i ), i = 1, 2. We shall denote the sets of stationary strategies for the players by M 1 and M 2 . Now, for any initial state of the controlled process, x 0 = x ∈ E, and for any pair of admissible strategies (π 1 , π 2 ) we denote by (Ω, F, P x (π 1 , π 2 )) the canonical probability space for the process {(x t , u [1] for the definition of the canonical probability space introduced above.) The expectation operator with respect to the measure P x (π 1 , π 2 ) will be denoted by E
. In this paper we shall be mainly concerned with ergodic cost functionals for both players. Thus, for every initial state x, and for every pair (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ Π 1 × Π 2 we define the cost functional of player i as
We shall also need an auxiliary notion of α-discounted cost functional for player i,
εα ) of admissible strategies is called an εα-Discounted Nash Equilibrium Point (εα-DNEP ) if for all x ∈ E, π 1 ∈ Π 1 and π 2 ∈ Π 2 , the following inequalities hold:
(ii) For each ε > 0 the pair (π 1 ε , π 2 ε ) of admissible strategies is called an ε-Ergodic Nash Equilibrium Point (ε-ENEP ) if for all x ∈ E, π 1 ∈ Π 1 and π 2 ∈ Π 2 , the following inequalities hold:
The following theorem is due to Whitt ( [3] , Theorem 5.1).
Theorem 1.1. Assume that A1 and A2 are satisfied. Then for any ε > 0 and α ∈ [0, 1) there exists an εα-DNEP in the set
Whitt obtained the above result by means of approximating the initial discounted game on a general state space with an appropriate sequence of simpler games defined on countable state spaces, and demonstrating that if the approximation parameter n is large enough than the α-discounted Nash equilibrium strategies for the approximating game also constitute an εα-DNEP for the initial game with discounted costs. See [3] for details.
In Section 2 we shall use Theorem 1.1 and some ideas from Dynkin and Yushkevich ( [2] , Chapter 7) to prove the existence of an ε-ENEP for the ergodic game considered in this paper.
Existence results.
We start with defining, for each pair of measures (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ P(U 1 )×P(U 2 ), operators acting on the space U (E) of real-valued, bounded and universally measurable functions on E:
for all r ∈ U (E) and x ∈ E.
Definition 2.1. For each ε > 0, µ i ∈ P(U i ) and f i , r i ∈ U (E), i = 1, 2, the following system of conditions is called an ε-canonical system:
2 ), i = 1, 2) are any ε-canonical quadruples then the pair of stationary strategies (µ 1,∞ , µ 2,∞ ) constitutes an ε-ENEP. P r o o f. Let us first define, for x ∈ E, ν i ∈ P(U i ), i = 1, 2, and a finite integer N ,
where
Using induction on N we shall show that (2.2)
∀x ∈ E, µ ∈ P(U 2 ).
For N = 1 inequalities (2.2) follow by assumption. Suppose then that (2.2) is valid for N = k > 1. From the definition of W 1N r 1 we obtain
for all x ∈ E and µ ∈ P(U 1 ). Similar reasoning for i = 2 leads to
for all x ∈ E and µ ∈ P(U 2 ).
On the other hand, we have
To end the proof it is now sufficient to divide (2.2) by N , and let the N go to ∞, also using boundedness of r i , i = 1, 2.
We precede the statement of Lemma 2.2 below with the following definitions:
R e m a r k 2.1. It follows from Corollary 9.4.1 of [1] , or Theorem B on p. 85 of [2] , that the functions f 
for all x ∈ E and i = 1, 2.
P r o o f. From (2.3) and the additivity of the cost functionals
Let us now set β = 1 − ν(E) and define new transition probabilities
for any x ∈ E, B ∈ E, u 1 ∈ U 1 and u 2 ∈ U 2 . We shall refer to the game with dynamics given in terms of the transition probabilities p as the game N (p), whereas the game with the modified dynamics given in (2.5) will be referred to as the game N (p). The following modifications of the operators T i µ 1 ,µ 2 , S i µ 1 ,µ 2 , and Λ µ 1 ,µ 2 will be needed in the remaining part of the paper: 
